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Abstract
Current authentication methods on the Web have serious weak-
nesses. First, services heavily rely on the traditional password
paradigm, which diminishes the end-users’ security and us-
ability. Second, the lack of attribute-based authentication does
not allow anonymity-preserving access to services. Third, users
have multiple online accounts that often reflect distinct identity
aspects. This makes proving combinations of identity attributes
hard on the users.
In this paper, we address these weaknesses by proposing a
privacy-preserving architecture for device-centric and attribute-
based authentication based on: 1) the seamless integration be-
tween usable/strong device-centric authentication methods and
federated login solutions; 2) the separation of the concerns for
Authorization, Authentication, Behavioral Authentication and
Identification to facilitate incremental deployability, wide adop-
tion and compliance with NIST assurance levels; and 3) a novel
centralized component that allows end-users to perform iden-
tity profile and consent management, to prove combinations of
fragmented identity aspects, and to perform account recovery
in case of device loss. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first effort towards fusing the aforementioned techniques under
an integrated architecture. This architecture effectively deems
the password paradigm obsolete with minimal modification on
the service provider’s software stack.
1 Introduction
Authentication in the web relies on the password paradigm,
which was developed during the 60s for accessing monolithic
mainframe computers. We admit that a 128-bit very complex
and long (∼20 characters) password used for a specific service
is highly secure when it is only stored in the brain of the user
and it is computationally hard to guess. However, as the needs
and number of web services increases, the password paradigm
entails an inextricable tension between security and usability as
users become burdened with memorizing and managing multi-
ple passwords. At the same time, passwords can be shoulder-
surfed, key-logged, replayed, eavesdropped, brute-forced and
phished. In addition, password databases can be leaked and
even if the service follows security good practices (i.e., hashing
and salting the passwords), the attacker can guess the password
by performing a dictionary-based brute-force attack. Over the
years, the scientific community repeatedly pinpointed the flaws
of the password paradigm [7, 28, 4, 17].
Fig. 1 depicts the three main caveats of the currently preva-
lent web authentication paradigm. First, the password overload
problem where users need to remember one secure password
for each service. As a consequence, users resort in re-using
the same password for each service they maintain [20]. Sec-
ond, there is lack of support for Attribute Based Access Control
(ABAC), which facilitates account-less authentication through
identity attributes (i.e., age or location). Last, a user’s identity
is fragmented across multiple services. This renders the task of
proving account joint-ownership of services hard for end-users.
Recent efforts aim at mitigating the aforementioned prob-
lems by proposing dedicated solutions. Specifically: 1) fed-
erated authentication solutions (i.e., OpenID Connect1) alle-
viate the password overload problem by enabling a Service
Provider (SP) to delegate the authentication of end-users to a
trusted entity called Identity Provider (IdP); 2) strong and us-
able password-less authentication mechanisms, such as FIDO
UAF2; and 3) cryptographic credential stacks that facilitate
Privacy-preserving Attribute-based Access Control (PABAC)
such as Idemix [8] and U-Prove3. Despite the fact that the afore-
mentioned solutions mitigate the problems to some extent, they
suffer from deployability issues as SPs are required to deploy
multiple specialized components within their infrastructure.
Other studies [30, 24, 2] propose the use of password man-
agers, which enable the user to use distinct strong passwords
for each online service they use, while the burden of maintain-
ing and remembering the password is offloaded to the password
1http://openid.net/connect
2https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/overview
3https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/u-prove-
cryptographic-specification-v1-1-revision-3/
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Figure 1: Caveats of the prevalent web authentication paradigm: 1) password overload; 2) identity fragmentation; and 3) lack of support for
Attribute-based Access Control.
manager. However, unlike device-centric authentication with
FIDO public-key cryptography, password managers still rely on
secret tokens. Therefore, password managers are susceptible to
online guessing, replay, session hijacking, eavesdropping and
breach attacks.
In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving federated ar-
chitecture for device-centric authentication (DCA) that aims to
anchor all users’ access control needs to devices (i.e., smart-
phones) that they habitually carry along. ”Something that end-
users almost always have with them”, allows users to not have
to always ”know something for all those accounts they main-
tain”, thus solving the password overload problem.
Moreover, DCA requires special authenticators that most
SPs do not have. Following recent industry trends, we pro-
pose the integration of the design elements proposed by the
FIDO Alliance for strong authentication mechanisms, and from
the OpenID Foundation for federated authentication. This inte-
gration enables a federated authentication solution where end-
users are able to authenticate using biometrics. The main ad-
vantage of this approach is that the core authentication func-
tionality resides on a trusted entity (IdP), and services (SPs) are
able to incrementally adopt this approach with minimal modi-
fications to their infrastructure.
DCA and federation enables the enclosure of strong crypto-
graphic protocols transparent to the user within the device, thus
seamlessly supporting anonymity-preserving attribute-based
authentication. Additionally, the various sensors embedded in
mobile devices facilitate behavioral authentication by capturing
various behavioral profiles (such as gait, keystroke, etc.). For in-
creased assurance we employ Mobile Connect (MC)4, which is
the equivalent of a secure SIM authenticator where the Mobile
Network Operator (MNO) act as an IdP. Therefore, promoting
the device to the main authentication gateway not only eases the
user from the burden of remembering multiple complex pass-
words, but also facilitates technically complex but needed au-
thenticators that make our architecture fully aligned with the
latest NIST standards for authentication5.
However, we admit that the mobile device becoming the
main authentication gateway is not by itself a universal rem-
4https://www.gsma.com/identity/mobile-connect
5NIST stands for National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) https:
//pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/
edy as it entails serious caveats. First, it becomes a single point
of failure in case of device loss or failure; we believe that the
lack of an efficient device failure/loss recovery mechanism is
the main reason passwords are still in use and they have not
been replaced by RSA keys. Second, the device is vulnerable
to hijacking after the user has been authenticated. To overcome
these problems, we propose a reliable failure recovery mecha-
nism by leveraging a centralized entity, dubbed Identity Consol-
idator (IDC), in conjunction with MC authentication and a sep-
arate entity for behavioral authentication, called Behavioral Au-
thentication Authority (BAA). At the same time, BAA ensures
that unauthorized access to services by illegitimate holders of
the device is prevented. Besides failure recovery, the IDC also
offers identity and privacy management and allows to prove
combinations of fragmented identity aspects, thus solving the
identity fragmentation problem.
Contributions. In summary, with the proposed architecture we
make the following contributions:
1. We demonstrate the merits of the seamless integration be-
tween strong/usable password-less authentication methods
and federated login solutions.
2. We offer support for privacy-preserving ABAC on the mo-
bile device.
3. We propose the separation of concerns for Authentication,
Authorization and Behavioral Authentication to IdPs, SPs
and BAAs respectively. This enables the incremental de-
ployability of the proposed architecture.
4. We provide a rich set of features to the user through the
IDC. Specifically, a user can manage the spectrum of her
online accounts and define options that will enhance her
security, privacy and user experience on the Web.
5. We propose the use of an innovative failure recovery
mechanism, which is realized through the IDC, and be-
havioral and MC authentication.
Organization. In Section 2, we define important terminology
and the required background. In Section 3, we define the threat
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model and the requirements that enable the design of our ar-
chitecture. Section 4 provides a description of the main com-
ponents our proposed architecture comprises. In Section 5, we
report the design of our architecture while in Section 6 and Sec-
tion 7 we describe and evaluate our prototype implementation,
respectively. Finally, we review the related work in Section 8,
and we conclude in Section 9.
2 Terminology and Background
2.1 Terminology
User Device (UD). This is the main gateway to get to DCA. In
this work, we assume a user device that is able to utilize recent
advances in the field of Trusted Execution Environments [25].
This enables the device to securely safeguard cryptographic
credentials within its software stack.
Identity Providers (IdP). These are trusted entities that are
responsible for securely maintaining and transferring end-
users’ identity attributes. They incorporate strong authentica-
tion mechanisms so that they can regulate end-users access. In
the context of Privacy-Preserving Attribute-based Access Con-
trol, IdPs are responsible for issuing and verifying the end-
users’ cryptographic credentials.
Identity Consolidator (IDC). This is a centralized trusted en-
tity that acts as the main IdP and manages all the access control
needs of the user. The user is able to authenticate to the IDC,
issue and verify cryptographic credentials, perform failure re-
covery (in case of lost or damaged device), and lock/unlock its
online accounts.
Service Providers (SP). These are entities that are responsible
only for authorizing end-users to their service. All other criti-
cal operations (i.e., authentication, verification of credentials)
are performed by delegating them to trusted entities (IdPs) via
Federated solutions, such as OpenID Connect (OIDC).
Behavioral Authentication Authorities (BAA). BAAs are
special instance of IdPs that offer behavioral authentication to
SPs. These entities maintain various behavioral profiles for each
user that are obtained using signals that are either captured by
the user’s device or by the BAA itself, depending on the trait
type. For instance, a BAA deployed by a Telco is able to cap-
ture the browsing history or traffic patterns on its own, whereas
a gait trait requires signals from the user device. Based on these
profiles, BAAs offer on-demand and continuous behavioral au-
thentication to SPs.
2.2 Background
Federated Authentication. SPs can delegate the authentica-
tion to a trusted entity (i.e., IdP) that can authenticate the end-
user with strong authenticators without the need of modifica-
tions in the SP’s authentication stack. Furthermore, federated
login solutions are privacy-enhancing because user information
is stored and maintained in secure IdPs and can be managed
by the end-users. At the same time, the secure delivery of ver-
ified identity attributes to SPs is enabled. In this work, we pro-
pose the use of the OIDC specification, which works as follows:
When an SP needs to authenticate an end-user, it redirects him
to an IdP in order to authenticate her. After the authentication
is completed at the IdP (through an IdP-defined authentication
mechanism), the end-user is redirected back to the SP, which
can identify who the user is. Then the SP can obtain, with the
user’s explicit consent, identity attributes from the IdP.
Strong and Usable Authentication Mechanisms (FIDO
UAF). One of the main objectives of the proposed architec-
ture is to offer a secure and usable authentication solution. To
this end, we propose the use of a secure password-less solu-
tion that use strong cryptographic operations in order to au-
thenticate end-users, namely FIDO UAF. FIDO UAF utilizes
biometrics in order to locally authenticate end-user and strong
cryptographic operations to authenticate the device with the re-
mote service. When a user authenticates with her device using
biometrics, he unlocks the stored cryptographic keys which are
subsequently used for authentication to the remote service.
Privacy-Preserving Attribute-based Access Control
(PABAC). We propose the integration of attribute-based
state-of-the-art cryptographic credentials stacks with Feder-
ated solutions. Specifically, we propose the deployment of
Idemix [8] and U-Prove cryptographic stacks on trusted entities
(IdPs), and the use of OIDC to prove attributes to SPs in an
anonymity-preserving fashion.
3 Threat Model and Requirements
In this section we define the threat model and the requirements
for the proposed architecture. Both the requirements and threat
model guide the design and definition of our architecture as de-
scribed in Section 4 and Section 5.
3.1 Threat Model
The proposed architecture faces various threats that we must
identify. We categorize the identified threats according to the
main components of our architecture.
User Device. The mobile device of the user is the most vulner-
able component in our architecture. We admit that the mobile
device can be stolen by an attacker who might or might not be
able to perform software (i.e., side channel attack) and/or hard-
ware attacks.
Service and Identity Providers. Like every online service, the
SPs in our architecture face various threats. First, we have to
ensure that the tokens and all the messages exchanged between
the server and the clients are protected and will not be disclosed
to an attacker during an authentication. Second, we assume
an attacker who is able to perform Active (Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM), Impersonation, Session Hijacking), Cross Site Request
Forgery (CSRF), and Replay attacks. Last, a compromised IdP
is another threat.
User Privacy. The privacy of the user is of vital importance in
our architecture. A malicious SP is in place to identify a user
through a combination of context from a series of transactions.
Even if standard anonymization practices are performed by the
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user, if two or more authorized entities (SPs and/or IdPs) are
colluding, the user can be identified.
3.2 Requirements
To provide a complete solution and address all the aforemen-
tioned problems and threats, our architecture should fulfill the
following requirements:
R1: Standards Compliance. The proposed system should be
compliant with open standards. This is crucial as it allows in-
cremental deployability, which can lead to the wide adoption of
the proposed architecture.
R2: Ease of deployment. Incremental deployability is impor-
tant for the wide adoption of our solution. SPs participating in
our architecture should be able to offer strong authentication
mechanisms to their end-users without the need to modify their
software stack.
R3: Identity Federation and Management. To combat iden-
tity fragmentation, users should have a federated identity on the
web that they can use to prove various attributes of their identity
to IdPs and/or SPs in order to get access to specific resources.
This requires a centralized entity that will consolidate the var-
ious online accounts of a user while enabling him to maintain
control over her identity attributes.
R4: Failure Recovery. All user access control needs should be
anchored to her device, which enables authentication with vari-
ous usable and cryptographically strong methods. Furthermore,
the proposed architecture should support appropriate failure re-
covery mechanisms in case of device loss, theft or failure. This
will allow the unobstructed access to online services during un-
fortunate events.
R5: Privacy-preserving ABAC. In this work, we aim at pro-
viding attribute-based authentication while preserving users’
privacy. In a typical ABAC scenario the SPs should run the ap-
propriate cryptographic verification stacks in order to be able
to authenticate specific attributes. However, this introduces de-
ployability issues since not all SPs are able to run exotic cryp-
tographic stacks. Thus, a critical requirement is to enable SPs
that do not run cryptographic credentials to support privacy-
preserving ABAC.
R6: Multi-factor Authentication. SPs that provide access to
critical resources may require additional authentication for their
users for higher assurance. Because of that, our architecture
should offer additional authentication mechanisms to be trig-
gered whenever SPs wish to further verify the identity of a user.
4 Architectural Overview
In this section we describe the main pillars of our architecture.
This architecture consists of the following: 1) User Device; 2)
Identity Consolidator; 3) Identity Provider; 4) Service Provider;
and 5) Behavioral Authentication Authorities. Fig. 2 depicts our
proposed architecture including its main components and the
interfaces that interconnects them. All the communications be-
tween the components are built around OIDC protocol and by
switching SP and IdP roles. Below we describe in detail the
functionality and the modules that comprise each component.
4.1 User Device (UD)
The mobile device of the user is central in our architecture
as we aim to provide device-centric authentication. We take ad-
vantage of the FIDO UAF protocol to make the user’s device
the main gateway for accessing services on the web. By deploy-
ing the FIDO UAF protocol stack we enable human-to-device
authentication using biometrics (e.g., fingerprint). The device
also runs federated authentication protocols (such as OIDC)
with IdPs and SPs (aka, relying parties) for authorization and
authentication purposes.
Furthermore, we deploy cryptographic credential stacks
(Idemix and U-Prove) on the device to enable PABAC. These
stacks allow users to request from the IDC and/or their IdPs
the issuance of cryptographic credentials. The issued creden-
tials are stored in a secure fashion in the Cryptographic Creden-
tials Storage (CCS), which is also part of the user’s device. The
cryptographic credentials stack is also responsible for revealing
issued credentials to IdPs during an authentication. Credentials
stored in the CCS should not be exported even if the device has
been compromised. This is achieved using a Trusted Execution
Environment.
To enable continuous and second-factor authentication, the
software running on the mobile device includes a behavioral
profile capture module, which is responsible for capturing the
behavior of the user taking advantage of the various sensors
available on the mobile device.
4.2 Identity Consolidator (IDC)
The IDC is an integral component in our architecture. It is a
centralized fully trusted entity that can be considered as a spe-
cial instance of an IdP, which offers identity and privacy man-
agement and is required for failure recovery. The IDC collects
identity attributes from various IdPs upon a user’s request. The
collected attributes are securely stored in a repository within
the IDC. The following modules comprise the IDC: a) Authen-
tication management; b) Account management; c) Identity and
Consent management; d) Credential management; and e) Iden-
tity integration.
Authentication Management Module (AuthMM). It encap-
sulates a FIDO-enhanced federated login protocol, which al-
lows the IDC to act as an OpenID Connect IdP for undertaking
FIDO authentication. This module also allows the IDC to run
federated login protocols for transferring identity attributes be-
tween distinct IdPs. Apart from these, the AuthMM also offers
the appropriate failure recovery mechanisms in cases where the
user loses access to her device.
Account Management Module (AMM). This module enables
the users to manage the status of their accounts in various SPs
and IdPs. A user can protect her accounts by locking access to
them in case of device loss. The IDC can also act on behalf of
the user and lock her online accounts when it detects a high risk
of account compromise. The AMM is responsible to keep track
of all the BAAs, SPs, and IdPs of a user and it also allows BAA,
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Figure 2: Privacy preserving architecture for device-centric and attribute-based authentication. The main architectural components with the
modules that comprises each component.
SP, and IdP admins to register their entities with the IDC. Using
this knowledge, the AMM acts as a BAA discovery service for
SPs that may require a second-factor authentication. Besides
these, the AMM allows the users to manage their IDC account,
for example to set their preferred degree of privacy within the
IDC (e.g., no attribute stored on the IDC) or completely delete
her account. Lastly, the AMM facilitates the integration of the
Mobile Connect protocol within our architecture. To achieve
this, IDC act as a relay for SPs that request MC authentication
(see Subsection 5.4). This is important because SP registration
to Mobile Connect is costly.
Credential ManagementModule (CMM). The CMM enables
ABAC in our architecture. This module runs cryptographic cre-
dential stacks (Idemix/U-Prove) that allows users to issue cryp-
tographic credentials, from their verified identity attributes, di-
rectly to their mobile device and then use them to access a vari-
ety of SPs. The issued credentials can also be backed-up at the
IDC for failure recovery purposes. The CMM also provides the
required functionality for managing cryptographic credentials.
Identity Management Module (IMM). IMM empowers users
to manage their identity information. This service consists of
the profile and the consent management modules. The profile
management provides easy browsing and management of the
identity attributes that IdPs and SPs know about a user and in-
forms her about the risks of involuntary attributes inference.
It also allows users to transfer attribute values between differ-
ent IdPs by extending federated login protocols (OpenID Con-
nect). The consent management allows users and IdPs to define
consent policies with respect to revealing specific attributes to
specified SPs and IdPs.
Identity Integration module (IIM). The main responsibil-
ity of this module is the standardization and normalization of
the users’ identity information. We acquire the users’ iden-
tity information via physical means (e.g., leveraging the Near
Field Communication (NFC) technology6 to read the user’s e-
Passport information) and we also perform online identity ac-
quisition where the IDC acts as an SP to receive the users’ iden-
tity attributes from other IdPs through OIDC. The IIM encap-
sulates the required logic for combining, fusing, inferring and
validating identity attributes.
4.3 Identity Providers (IdP)
Within our architecture, IdPs are entities that authenticate
users and share their identity attributes with SPs. Each IdP has
an identity repository that stores users’ attributes. IdPs also run
cryptographic credential stacks (i.e., Idemix and U-Prove) that
facilitate the issuance or verification of cryptographic (PABAC)
credentials from the stored identity attributes.
4.4 Service Providers (SP)
SPs require minimal modifications. Namely, they only have
to run an OIDC client in order to communicate with other en-
tities in our architecture. SPs are also able to support FIDO
and PABAC without the need to run any sophisticated crypto-
graphic stacks by involving IdPs in the authentication process.
Furthermore, SPs incorporate their business logic within access
control policies. Access control (AC) policies can be managed
by the SP administrator using an Access Control Policy Rea-
soning tool. Taking into account the defined AC policies, this
tool evaluates users’ requests on resources based on their pro-
vided attributes. Besides this, the tool also recommends to SPs’
admins policy improvements derived from a machine learning
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Near field communication
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algorithm that considers existing policies and the types of re-
quests.
4.5 Behavioral Authentication Authorities
(BAA)
BAAs are separate entities that provide both on-demand and
continuous behavioral authentication as part of an entire DCA
solution. To achieve this, BAAs continuously track the users’
behavior through various means and offer a behavioral solution
to either SPs or the IDC as a second or third factor authentica-
tion. Specifically, when requested by an SP or the IDC, BAAs
act as an IdP that can verify whether the behavior of a user re-
mains consistent with her usual habits. The behavioral authenti-
cation outcome is released to the aforementioned entities using
OIDC. However, since behavior is not privacy-preserving we
offer behavioral authentication as a second or third factor while
the first-factor can be privacy-preserving using PABAC.
4.6 Privacy-Preserving Attribute-based Access
Control (PABAC)
We enable PABAC by integrating the Idemix and U-Prove
cryptographic credential stacks within the OIDC Provider on
the IdPs. In this way, an IdP can act as a credential issuer and/or
verifier. Users can request the issuance of cryptographic creden-
tials by these IdPs or the IDC. This solution has various advan-
tages which are: 1) SPs are not required to deploy any crypto-
graphic credential stacks to support PABAC. Instead, they del-
egate the verification of PABAC credentials to IdPs; and 2) it
allows for more flexibility as PABAC-enabled IdPs might not
be collocated with SPs.
5 Design
In this section we provide adequate information regarding the
design of our architecture and how we address the requirements
set above.
We propose an architecture in which everything is built on
top of the OIDC specification. We choose to use OIDC with
infrastructure authenticator IdPs for incremental deployability.
This is a central design choice that allows us to clearly separate
the concerns of SPs and IdPs during an authentication, thus ad-
dressing requirements R1 and R2.
5.1 Diverse Authentication Framework
We propose a NIST-compliant [1] diverse authentication
framework for the end-users. Specifically, our federated ar-
chitecture offers various authentication modalities, thus sup-
porting all the assurance levels defined by NIST. Depending
on which is used, the granted Authenticator Assurance Level
(AAL) is determined. For example, the highest degree of assur-
ance (AAL3) requires a hardware-based cryptographic authen-
ticator and two-factor authentication. We achieve this with an
enhanced FIDO UAF specification that takes advantage of the
TEE that run on end-user devices combined with a secure SIM
(Mobile Connect). Here we assume that in the future FIDO and
Mobile Connect will be as secure as a hardware cryptographic
token (FIPS 140-27) because of advances in TEE.
Moreover, a backup password along with behavioral authen-
tication provides the lower degree of assurance (AAL1), while
FIDO UAF authentication alone provides AAL2.
5.2 FIDO-enhanced Federated Authentication
OpenID Connect is a simple federated identity layer on top
of the OAuth 2.0 protocol8, which facilitates federated authen-
tication. Thus, OIDC specification enables SPs to delegate the
authentication of end-users to IdPs, as well as to obtain profile
information about an end-user from the IdPs in an interoperable
manner.
The FIDO Alliance provides the FIDO UAF specification,
which is a password-less solution that enables IdPs to authenti-
cate end-users using strong authenticators (e.g., fingerprint) for
user-to-device authentication and cryptographic protocols for
device-to-service authentication (e.g., RSA). By combining the
concepts of strong authentication alongside with the delegation
of authentication to IdPs we allow for a more user-friendly and
secure solution for end-users.
5.3 Federated Privacy-preserving Attribute-
based Authentication
The various components that comprise our architecture were
carefully designed in order to provide a PABAC solution on top
of the OIDC while also addressing requirement R5. PABAC
enables SPs that are not aware of any cryptographic credentials
stack to allow end-users to use cryptographic credentials and
get access to their resources. To this end, we propose a custom
authentication module within the OIDC Provider that acts as
Idemix/U-Prove verifier, thus allowing IdPs to issue and verify
cryptographic credentials. In fact, with this module we modify
the OIDC Provider so that it uses one-time pseudonyms instead
of persistent unique identifiers.
Federated PABAC offers two concepts of anonymity, namely
untraceability and unlinkability. Untraceability is the security
property that precludes the IdP that issued an attribute creden-
tial from tracking to which SP the credential has been shown.
Unlinkability is the property that prevents an IdP or SP from
realizing that two or more distinct sessions under the same at-
tribute credential have been initiated by the same user [8]. At
the same time, users’ privacy is preserved since they are able
to authenticate to SPs by revealing only the required attributes
without revealing their complete identities.
5.4 Mobile Connect (MC) as a Service
In our architecture we enable SPs to authenticate users using
MC. Though the IDC we offer MC as a Service, thus allowing
incremental deployability of the MC protocol even if the SP
is not registered with the MC API Providers. To achieve this,
the IDC acts as a proxy to SPs for discovering and contacting
MC IdPs (Mobile Network Operators-MNOs) on behalf of the
7https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final
8https://oauth.net/2/
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SP. In this way, we see MNOs as any other IdP within our ar-
chitecture using OIDC. The IDC acts as an MC SP to retrieve
the required attributes and then acts as a vanilla OIDC provider
that proves those attributes to another SP that is not registered
in the MC ecosystem. In this way, the SPs do not have to be
aware of the MC protocol. They just need to know the value of
attributes that can be verified at the required AAL only by MC
IdPs. Which attributes are those and how they can be retrieved
is knowledge that is available only to the IDC.
5.5 Failure Recovery Framework
When moving the authentication to the mobile device there
are serious caveats that we should consider as we also under-
line in requirement R4. The most crucial one involves recovery
after device loss or failure. Another problem is that in case the
device is stolen, the thief has direct access to the secret. We ad-
dress the first problem via the IDC that federates multiple inde-
pendent factors (e.g. MC and BAA). These independent factors
can be easily used in conjunction with a single secure backup
password or physical identity verification to reliably authenti-
cate the user during recovery. The second problem is addressed
via FIDO on devices.
Using MC and a BAA the user has to first login to the IDC
using her secure backup password, which is required only for
failure recovery. By doing so, she is granted only temporary and
tentative access (AAL1), which provides limited functionality.
In particular, she cannot view, restore or manage credentials and
identity attributes. Subsequently, the IDC acts as SP authenti-
cating the user through a Telco IdP via MC. Because the user
cannot use FIDO to authenticate, she is able to authenticate via
SMS9 using her newly issued by the MNO SIM card. In case
of device theft or loss, to ensure that the authentication attempt
is performed by the legitimate user, the IDC needs to confirm
with the MC IdP that the given device was reported as lost and
a new SIM card was issued. Additionally, in case the user is not
registered with MC then she can use any other OIDC/FIDO-
compliant IdP.
For increased assurance the IDC also needs to authenticate
the user via one of the trusted BAAs that are registered under
her account. The user authenticates to her BAA using a backup
password (specific to the BAA). We note that the user does not
have to memorize this backup password since she is able to
backup all her backup passwords to the IDC. BAAs can have
insecure and easy to memorize backup passwords as their au-
thentication modality is behavioral and the backup password is
used only to prevent denial of service attacks.
After the user has authenticated, the BAA grants the user ten-
tative access and she is not allowed to manage her behavioral
profile until her signature is verified as that of the legitimate
user’s. With the user having tentative BAA access, the device
sends behavioral records to the BAA, while all the records prior
to the new device login are not considered for the authentica-
tion. The IDC acts as an SP while the BAA acts as an IdP au-
9We acknowledge the vulnerabilities of the SS7-based SMS system [3]. In any
case the authentication to the MNO IdP can take place in secure ways like
FIDO where the public key of the device is installed during the new SIM
registration or with a secure version of SMS [19]
thenticating the user based on her behavior. Once the BAA has
collected sufficient records to give a verdict on whether the user
behaves as usual the result is returned to the IDC via OIDC. If
the verdict is negative the BAA locks that device out of its IdP.
If the verdict is positive, then the user is granted full access
(AAL3) to the IDC and the BAA issues new FIDO credentials
for her account to the new device. Both MC and BAA authen-
tication is needed because BAA does not formally increase the
NIST authenticator assurance level but it is just an extra assur-
ance.
We note that if the user does not wish to use a backup pass-
word, she is able to recover from failure with physical identity
verification by scanning her ePassport using her mobile device.
Leveraging the NFC capabilities of the device we are able to
acquire the verified identity of the user. If the acquired identity
matches the one that she had proved to the IDC before the fail-
ure, then she is granted temporary and tentative access to the
IDC.
5.6 Multi-device Support
For usability purposes, we identified the need to support mul-
tiple devices. Thus, we modified the FIDO UAF client and
server software so that it allows the user to register multiple
FIDO cryptographic keys, one for each device they use, for each
account they have. This modification enables the users to main-
tain multiple devices.
Besides this, we also support multiple type of devices. For
example, a user is able authenticate to an SP through her desk-
top computer. To achieve this, we integrate a Quick Response
(QR) authentication server within the IdP’s OIDC software to
enable authentication from desktop computers to SPs using
FIDO. Therefore, there is no need for the users to run any user
device components on their desktop computers.
We acknowledge that the availability of the mobile device of
the user is crucial since a mobile device is required for authen-
tication. However, this is also a limitation for FIDO and DCA
in general.
5.7 De-anonymization Risks and Privacy As-
sessment
Preserving users’ privacy is of vital importance in our ar-
chitecture. Thus, we provide to the users privacy risk indica-
tors that define the risk of involuntary de-anonymization. To
achieve this, we extend OIDC so that it keeps logs of the iden-
tity attributes revealed to SPs. De-anonymization risk calcula-
tion can be separated into two categories based on the protocol
that a user is using to authenticate. The first concerns the de-
anonymization risk calculation for vanilla OIDC whereas the
latter for PABAC (Idemix/U-Prove).
In the OIDC case, we calculate the confidence probability of
whether an SP can infer the value of an attribute that the user
has not explicitly revealed based on which attributes she has
already revealed. Due to their nature, Idemix and U-Prove pro-
vide unlinkability and untraceability. This differentiates the risk
calculation from the one performed for OIDC. This calculation
does not depend on the attributes that the user has shared with
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an SP in the past since PABAC prevents the SP from linking
new sessions with past ones. The calculation is made based on
the attribute or combination of attributes that the user is about
to share with an SP.
Note that if the user uses untraceable and unlinkable
attribute-based authentication the de-anonymization risk de-
pends on the rarity of the attribute combinations presented to
the IdP and SP in a given population and the degree that the SP
and IdP know the distribution of attributes in the population.
5.8 Deployability and Adoption
Federated architectures have many significant benefits for
adopters. First, user experience is enhanced since an end-user
has to consolidate and prove her identity once at the IDC and
then it can be reused to access multiple IdPs and SPs. Second,
their is a significant cost reduction to both the end-users (reduc-
tion in authenticators) and the SPs (reduction in infrastructure).
On the one hand, end-users do not have to remember dozens
of passwords and at the same time they are able to retain their
anonymity using PABAC. On the other hand, SPs can offer
FIDO and PABAC authentication to their end-users without
the need to deploy any cryptographic stacks within their infras-
tructure. In addition, there is significant data minimization for
SPs because they do not need to pay for collection and stor-
age of personal identity information. As a result, SPs can focus
on their mission rather than the business of identity manage-
ment [1].
Furthermore, it is clear that IdPs are crucial in federated ar-
chitectures. However, what are the incentives for an organiza-
tion to play the role of the IdP? By participating in our archi-
tecture, an IdP has many benefits. For example, an organization
who maintains identity information about users (such as age)
can offer age verification services to SPs who require age veri-
fication from their end-users in order to abide by the online age
verification requirements imposed by regulators like the Gam-
bling Act 2005 legislation10 for remote gambling in UK.
6 Implementation
In this section we provide the details of our prototype imple-
mentation. We implemented all the architecture components as
well as all the protocol extensions and integrations that we de-
scribe in Section 5.
OIDC/FIDO UAF: To exploit the OIDC Provider features,
we make use of the OpenAM software11. We implemented,
within the OIDC Provider, a custom authentication module,
called FIDO UAF authentication module, which is responsible
for undertaking the authentication of the users according to the
FIDO UAF specification. To achieve this, our custom authenti-
cation module communicates with the FIDO UAF Server using
a REST interface. The FIDO UAF server handles the authenti-
cation of the user by communicating with the FIDO UAF client
that runs on users’ devices.
10https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/19/contents
11https://forgerock.org/openam/
OIDC/PABAC: PABAC is realized through the deployment
of Idemix/U-Prove credential stacks. To enable IdPs to act as
credentials issuers/verifiers we have implemented a custom au-
thentication module within the OIDC Provider. For this purpose
we use the FIWARE REST API12, which is able to utilize both
underlying cryptographic protocol stacks used in our architec-
ture.
Identity Consolidator: We have implemented the IDC compo-
nent and its respective modules as a web application. Within the
IDC we implemented a well defined REST interface that allows
all the other components of our architecture as well as all the
external entities to interact with the IDC.
Moreover, we also implemented an MC proxy service. More
precisely, we implemented a custom module within the IDC
that allows the IDC to act as an MC proxy. This custom module
invokes a GSMA Apigee API Exchange-enabled13 discovery
service on a trusted MC Provider. This API is mainly used as
the federation mechanism for MC authentication.
Behavioral Authentication: Stand-alone BAA entities offer-
ing on-demand and continuous behavioral authentication is one
of the most important contributions in this work. In the context
of this work, we implemented a prototype BAA entity for gait
verification including its client-side modules that capture the
gait of the end-user on her device. The captured behavior data is
immediately transferred to the BAA server through an authen-
ticated secure channel, and once the transmission is completed
we securely erase the behavioral data from the mobile device.
User Device: We implemented an Android application that in-
corporates all the required user device functionality. This appli-
cation runs a FIDO UAF client, the behavior capturing module,
and utilizes the TEE to store cryptographic credentials. We in-
crease maintainability by implementing each module as a sep-
arate Android library.
7 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our prototype implementation in
terms of performance, User Experience (UX), and security.
7.1 Performance Evaluation
Here we assess the performance of the proposed authenti-
cation solution (both OIDC/FIDO and OIDC/PABAC) against
the performance of the vanilla OIDC, FIDO UAF, and Idemix
protocols. Each experiment was conducted by sending a batch
of authentication requests within a second starting from 500 to
4000 requests, while measuring the average response time of
the server for each batch of authentication requests, this being
the time for all the authentication messages to be exchanged
between the client and the server. We note that all the authenti-
cation requests were successful.
OIDC/FIDO UAF. As described in Section 6, we implemented
a custom authentication module by deploying a FIDO UAF
server to the IdP’s software stack to enable IdPs authenticate
end-users using FIDO. Here, we evaluate this deployment in
12https://goo.gl/dkG5R8
13https://apigee.com/about/tags/api-exchange
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Figure 3: Average response time of an OIDC/FIDO UAF authentica-
tion request and vanilla OIDC authentication request.
terms of performance to identify: 1) how it performs under
high authentication demands; and 2) the overhead that our cus-
tom authentication module introduces compared to the vanilla
OIDC and FIDO protocols. We note that in our measurements
we do not count any user-induced delays (i.e., the time the user
needs to enter her password) and we use a 20 characters long
password for authentication wherever this is required (vanilla
OIDC).
Initially, we evaluate the performance of a vanilla OIDC de-
ployment by employing the standard OIDC authentication pro-
cess. A similar evaluation was also conducted for the vanilla
FIDO UAF authentication process. All the simulations were
performed by porting an Android client on a desktop, which im-
plements the required functionality for standard OIDC authen-
tication as well as for FIDO authentication, and we simulate the
parallel authentication processes using different threads.
Following the same approach, we evaluate our OIDC/FIDO
UAF authentication module. Again, the simulations were per-
formed by running our Android OIDC/FIDO client implemen-
tation on a desktop. We repeat each experiment 10 times and we
calculate the 95% confidence interval of the average response
time of each deployment as the number of authentication re-
quests increases. Figures 3 and 4 present the results of the eval-
uation of our custom authentication module as well as those
of vanilla OIDC and FIDO. We observe that our custom au-
thentication module scales along with the number of authenti-
cation requests, with the server’s average response time not be-
ing drastically impacted. Compared with the vanilla OIDC and
FIDO, our implementation does not introduce any substantial
delay in the authentication process: when the number of simul-
taneous authentication processes is 4K, the average response
time of an OIDC/FIDO authentication request is 4.5 sec and 2.4
sec more than the average response time of the vanilla OIDC
and FIDO protocols, respectively. Considering the advantages
of our proposed solution, we consider the additional delays as
negligible.
All the experiments were conducted using an OpenAM soft-
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
# of Authentication Requests within a second
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Av
er
ag
e 
Re
sp
on
se
 T
im
e 
(s
)
FIDO UAF
OIDC/FIDO UAF
Figure 4: Average response time of an OIDC/FIDO UAF authentica-
tion request and vanilla FIDO UAF authentication request.
ware stack and a FIDO UAF server which run in separate
docker14 containers on the IdP and the client requests are ex-
ecuted using an Internet connection.
OIDC/PABAC. Next, we conducted a similar evaluation of our
OIDC/PABAC custom authentication module. For this evalu-
ation we implemented a custom OIDC/PABAC authentication
module by utilizing the Idemix credentials stack. We deployed
the implemented module to the IdP’s software stack to enable
the IdP to act as an Idemix credential issuer and verifier. The
purpose of this evaluation is to identify: 1) how our PABAC-
enabled IdP performs under high authentication demands; and
2) the overhead that our implementation introduces compared
to the vanilla OIDC and Idemix protocols. We note that in our
measurements we do not count the time required for the is-
suance of the Idemix credential.
We evaluate both a vanilla Idemix deployment and our
OIDC/PABAC implementation. Similar to the OIDC/FIDO
evaluation, we repeat each experiment 10 times and we calcu-
late the 95% confidence interval of the average response time
of each deployment as the number of authentication requests
increases. Figures 5 and 6 present the results of the evaluation
of our OIDC/PABAC implementation compared with those of
the vanilla Idemix and OIDC protocols, respectively.
We observe that the average response time of our custom au-
thentication module follows a similar trend to the one of vanilla
Idemix authentication and it does not introduce substantial de-
lay in the authentication process: when the number of parallel
authentication processes is 4K, the average response time of
an OIDC/PABAC authentication request is 5.3 sec more than
the average response time of a vanilla Idemix authentication re-
quest.
7.2 User Experience (UX)
It is widely accepted that the quality of the User Experience
(UX) determines the success or the failure of any new solution.
14https://www.docker.com/
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Figure 5: Average response time of an OIDC/PABAC authentication
request and vanilla Idemix authentication request.
Heuristics Positive (%) Negative (%)
Easiness 90 10
System Status Visibility 88 12
Language 92 8
Control & Error Prevention 93 7
Table 1: Usability heuristics and their respective percentage of posi-
tive/negative evaluation.
The UX includes ”all the aspects of how people use a product:
the way it feels in their hands, how well they understand how it
works, how they feel about it while they are using it, how well it
serves their needs, and how well it fits into the entire context in
which they are using it” [5]. For this reason, the proposed solu-
tion needs to be assessed not only in terms of usability, but also
considering the way it enhances the whole UX. The UX evalua-
tion aims at ensuring that the solution is perceived as useful and
desirable according to users’ needs, easy to learn, as well as ef-
fective and efficient to achieve its specified goals (i.e. efficient
failure recovery).
The evaluation is performed through an iterative process in
which each step provides recommendations to further improve
the UX: 1) preliminary assessment by experts, who analyze the
level of compliance with the main usability heuristics [27] and
identify usability issues to fix; 2) test with a sample of end-users
through the ”think aloud method”, so to collect empirical data
while observing the users interacting with the system to per-
form realistic tasks [31]; and 3) collection of users’ feedback
through an online questionnaire. The focus of such evaluation
is not only on tasks and operations within the workflow, but
also on users’ expectations and perceptions related to the de-
sign concept, the features, the information architecture, as well
as the aesthetics.
Table 1 presents the preliminary results collected from 41 re-
spondents through the online questionnaire. The participants,
both male and female (aged 20-24 years), were recruited from
the Computer Engineering Department of Cyprus University of
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Figure 6: Average response time of an OIDC/PABAC authentication
request and vanilla OIDC authentication request.
Technology. The results of the survey provide positive feed-
back supporting the design, and suggestions to improve the UX.
Considering the impact on the UX, most of the respondents
(90%) agree that the solution provides a reliable and secure
authentication mechanism, and it makes the access to web ser-
vices easy and quick. Most of the respondents (92%) consider
the language (i.e. terms, messages) familiar and comprehensi-
ble and the organization of the information clear Furthermore,
88% of the respondents believe that the system keeps the users
informed about what is going on through the appropriate feed-
back (system status visibility), while 93% of them agree that
the system enables the user to easily diagnose and bypass er-
rors. While the weak aspects highlighted by the respondents
are related to learnability, help and documentation as well as
efficiency of the tasks and navigation flow. Thus, the further
improvement of the solution will address such issues.
7.3 Security Analysis
Here we discuss how we defend against all the possible at-
tacks defined in our threat model. We categorize the threats and
the mitigation strategies that we employ to defend against them
according to the main components of our architecture.
User Device. The mobile device of the user is the most critical
and vulnerable component in our architecture because it can be
stolen. First, assuming that we have an attacker who has stolen
the device and is not able to perform software attacks, our ar-
chitecture is able to effectively defend against such a threat by
employing multi-factor authenticators that need to be activated
through a biometric (FIDO and continuous behavioral authen-
tication) that can prevent an attacker from being authenticated
as the legitimate user; and more importantly by offering a spe-
cialized account locking module that is part of the AMM of the
IDC allowing the user to lock access to her online accounts on
the stolen device.
Next, we also examine the case where the attacker is able
to perform software attacks. If the behavior capturing proto-
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cols run in the Normal World (Rich OS), a skilled software at-
tacker can intervene and modify the contents of the memory
while also modify the information captured from the device’s
sensors. However, since all the local measurements are imme-
diately sent to the BAA and are not stored locally on the de-
vice then we can prevent such an attacker from bypassing the
behavioral authentication. On the other hand, if the protocols
run in the Secure World (aka Trust-Zone, or Trusted Execution
Environment-TEE), no software attacker can compromise the
memory and information paths. However, we do not have the
ability to develop protocols for TEE as the trusted computing
base has to be approved by vendors, such as Intel, Samsung,
etc. We can just invoke specific services of it, such as storing
cryptographic keys and performing secure cryptographic oper-
ations. For example, the activation of the on-demand behavioral
authentication with a verifier is triggered through TEE-enabled
secure biometrics (e.g., fingerprint). This is supplied by FIDO
and can protect the user in case the device has been recently
stolen and the behavioral signature has yet to change.
Last, when an attacker is able to perform software and hard-
ware attacks then she can bypass the trusted execution and
present himself as the legitimate user only if the device is re-
cently stolen, but again the owner of the device can lock access
to her online accounts on that device using the AMM.
Service and Identity Providers. SPs and IdPs in our architec-
ture face various threats. Initially, our solution guarantees that
the tokens are never exposed to unauthorized parties during an
authentication by establishing protected sessions between the
SPs/IdPs and the users. All the messages exchanged between
the SPs/IdPs and the users are sent over the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol.
Moreover, our architecture is able to defend against other
types of attacks. First, to defend against Active attacks like
MitM, Impersonation, and Session Hijacking attacks we gen-
erate access tokens to the authenticated users that are user- and
scope- restricted. Second, to defend against CSRF attacks we
perform header checks to verify the origin of the source and
destination for every request while also using CSRF tokens in
the communication between the user and the SP. Third, using
TLS for all the communications between the user device and the
IdPs/SPs we are able to defend against Replay attacks. Last, a
compromised IdP is not considered since this is a general prob-
lem of federated architectures. If an IdP is compromised, it af-
fects the authentication security only of the SPs that relies on
that IdP.
User Privacy. Two or more authorized entities (IdPs and SPs)
acting maliciously are considered attackers and might be in
place to identify a user. However, we are able to preserve the
privacy of users by employing advanced unlinkable and un-
traceable cryptographic credentials that are used by the users
to authenticate with PABAC-enabled IdPs. Additionally, using
the Consent Management module of the IDC, a user is able to
provide her consent when revealing identity attributes to SPs.
Last, the Profile Management module of the IDC offers to the
users useful privacy risk indicators for each one of their iden-
tity attributes. These indicators define the risk of involuntary
de-anonymization as well as the possibility of an attribute in-
ference.
8 Related Work
In this section we review existing work on password paradigm
alternatives, behavioral authentication, identity federation and
management, and attribute-based access control.
8.1 Password alternatives
It is evident that a 20 character random password used for
a specific account is quite secure, albeit not user-friendly. Our
ability to memorize secure passwords cannot compete with a
computer’s ability to guess them, thus it is impossible for users
to memorize multiple complex and long enough passwords for
each service they use.
In the last few years, the research community realized that
the password paradigm is not an ideal solution able to cope
with user authentication needs on the Web; mainly because of
usability and security concerns. At the same time, even rela-
tively secure passwords are not replay-resistant authenticators.
Therefore, various studies aim at either replacing the password
paradigm or propose solutions that mitigate its caveats. Specifi-
cally, [4, 26, 36] analyze the usability and security problems of
the password paradigm. All studies pinpoint the password over-
load problem which leads users to choose easy to remember
passwords or choose to reuse the same password across multi-
ple domains. Also, users’ perceptions of security seems to be
an important factor that influences effective password usage.
To overcome these issues, password managers like Pwd-
Hash [30], LastPass [24], and RoboForm [2] allow users to use
a variety of strong passwords for accessing their online ser-
vices, while the burden of maintaining and remembering the
password is offloaded to the password manager. However, some
works [12, 37] highlight that the use of password managers in-
troduce new security and usability issues. Namely, end-users
cannot properly use password managers and this makes them
susceptible to various attacks, while the protection mechanisms
of several password managers have many security flaws. For
example, most password managers are protected with a master
password. If the master password is leaked to an adversary then
the password manager becomes a central location for accessing
the user’s entire online presence. In contrast, in our solution a
backup password is only required for failure recovery and not
every time the user wants to authenticate with a service.
Additionally, passwords managers are susceptible to replay
or server breach attacks, while in our solution even if an ad-
versary overhears the challenge-response communication with
the IdP, he cannot sign another challenge without the FIDO se-
cure private-key. In case of a breach attack the compromised
IdP only contains a perfectly useless list of public-keys. In ad-
dition, each private-key can be as long and random as needed
to stay secure.
On top of the aforementioned, Karole et al. [23] highlight
additional users’ concerns with regard to the use of password
managers. That is, they feel more confident in storing their pass-
words locally instead of cloud-based password managers.
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Other studies propose alternatives to the password paradigm.
Stajano [34] proposes Pico, a password replacement which re-
lies on hardware tokens. At manufacturing time, SPs inject
unique keys in each token, which are used for authentication
purposes. In contrast to Pico, our architecture does not intro-
duce any extra hardware. Instead, we leverage a user’s mobile
device to store the necessary cryptographic keys for authentica-
tion purposes.
Trusona15 is a product that offers device-centric password-
less and multi-factor authentication through a mobile applica-
tion. A user can register by scanning one of her identity doc-
uments. Trusona is suitable for various use-cases ranging from
online authentication to wire transfers. With the IDC, we go be-
yond Trusona offering sophisticated identity federation, proof-
ing algorithms and standards-compliant FIDO authentication,
as well as continuous behavioral authentication.
8.2 Behavioral Authentication
Behavioral Authentication provides an extra layer of secu-
rity above our first factor of authentication. Seminal studies
have shown that common security authentication mechanisms
like PINs or patterns can be enhanced by adding the behavioral
factor as another mean of authentication [38, 15]. Google has
also identified the need for replacing the password with stronger
and more usable authentication mechanisms. Thus, Google pro-
vides the Trust API16, which offers multi-modal continuous au-
thentication by tracking a user’s behavior on her device (e.g.,
typing pattern, location, etc.).
Also, other solutions exist that continuously track users’ be-
havior for authentication purposes based on various behavior
types [22, 16, 33, 21]. However, the classifier’s location in most
of these approaches is not specified and they do not consider
battery, computational and space limitations. At the same time,
they only tackle observation and impersonation attacks. Unlike
the aforementioned solutions, we propose an open architec-
ture under which any entity able to capture user behavior can
offer behavioral authentication via OIDC, while also offering
enhanced protection against attackers that manage to compro-
mise the device. In addition, we perform continuous behaviour
authentication that allow us to have account- and device-wide
lockdown when the device is not held by its legitimate user.
Chow et al. [13] propose TrustCube, a framework that lever-
ages federated authentication schemes to authenticate users
based on their behavior on behalf of any SP. Similarly, in our
architecture, BAAs run OIDC for authenticating users based on
their behavior. However, we go beyond TrustCube by offering
BAAs as part of an entire DCA and identity consolidation so-
lution.
NuData Security17 and BehavioSec18 offer continuous be-
havioral authentication software as a service. They use real-
time behavioral and statistical analysis tools to resist attacks
like account fraud, sharing, and takeover. These solutions are
15https://www.trusona.com
16https://thisdata.com/blog/androids-trust-api-a-short-history-and-why-its-a-
game-changer
17https://nudatasecurity.com/
18https://www.behaviosec.com
typically deployed on the SP and are application-domain-
specific. In our approach, BAAs are independent entities that
can employ any type of behavioral authentication. BAAs har-
vest user behavior data from an end-user’s device in a non-
intrusive and battery efficient way. Thus, they can provide via
OIDC any type of indicator an SP deems necessary, spanning
from a simple boolean flag to statistical scores.
8.3 Identity Federation and Management
The past two decades numerous identity federation and man-
agement solutions have emerged. One of them is the WSO2
Identity Server19, which is an open source technology that when
integrated within an SP’s infrastructure can offer singe sign-on
(SSO), and identity federation and management. Unlike WSO2,
SPs in our architecture can have the same benefits by just run-
ning an OIDC client instead of having to deploy the whole so-
lution into their infrastructure.
OpenID 2.0 [29] is a user-centric identity management plat-
form in which each account has Identifiers (URI) at one or mul-
tiple IdPs, and enables an end-user to prove the possession of
such an identifier. Users that own the accounts must remember
each of their URIs, so some of them are used to access several
SPs for validation and authentication of the user. If these SPs
are malicious, then the users’ attributes could be correlated and
reveal their identities.
Other identity management approaches like Liberty20 and
SAML [9], offer federated user identities in a more privacy-
preserving way. IdPs use pseudonyms or aliases to reference
users to the SPs and these pseudonyms are different in each
SP. One SP cannot directly reference a user in the namespace
of another SP, thus preventing malicious SPs from colluding
to correlate user identities. Inspired by this approach, we ex-
tend OIDC to employ pseudonyms so that user anonymity is
maintained when they are used in conjunction with privacy-
preserving cryptographic credential stacks on the IdP.
Venkatadri et al. [35] propose a framework that leverages
information about identities that is aggregated across multiple
domains to reason about their trustworthiness. The authors pro-
pose multiple ways for linking the multiple online identities of
a user (e.g., using SSO protocols) that also enable the transfer
of trust between domains without significant loss of privacy or
implementation overhead for the IdPs. Instead, we deploy more
sophisticated algorithms for assessing the trustworthiness of a
user’s identity with high confidence (see Subsection 4.2).
A more akin to our architecture solution is the Secure
Identity Platform (SIP) by Civic21. Taking advantage of the
blockchain technology, SIP offers a decentralized identity veri-
fication and management solution through a mobile application.
Access to the identity information is protected with biometric
authentication. We consider our architecture as a more concrete
solution than SIP, offering a multi-factor password-less authen-
tication experience, while at the same time PABAC preserves
the privacy of the user.
19http://wso2.com/identity-and-access-management
20http://www.projectliberty.org
21https://www.civic.com/products/secure-identity-platform
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8.4 Attribute-based Access Control
Attribute-based access control provides a boolean model in
which resources are accessed only if the applicant has the ap-
propriate access attributes as defined by the so-called policies.
This access control model uses either one of two attribute based
encryption (ABE) methods. Key-policy ABE [18] uses the poli-
cies to create the applicant keys and uses the attributes to de-
scribe the encrypted data. Ciphertext-policy ABE [6] uses a
tree form access policy, where attributes are the leaves of the
tree. Ruj et al. [32] propose a privacy-preserving access control
scheme in the clouds, in which the attributes of each user be-
long to multiple key distribution centers [14]. The user’s iden-
tity information is stored in the cloud and the cloud acts as the
verifier for the users’ credentials. However, user privacy is not
protected in the cloud. Chase [10] introduces a multi-authority
KP-ABE scheme that overcomes the drawbacks of a single au-
thority attribute-based system. He proposes global identifiers
to distinguish different decryptors and allows independent au-
thorities to monitor attributes and secret keys in a distributed
storage. Based on their first proposal, Chase and Chow [11]
propose an improved version of the scheme were a polynomial
number of independent authorities is set to monitor attributes
and distribute secret keys.
In contrast with the above methods, we integrate in our ar-
chitecture cryptographic credentials stacks (such as Idemix [8]
and U-Prove) to let users prove their identity attributes to SPs
using cryptographic credentials that are securely stored on their
device. In addition, by integrating PABAC with OIDC we en-
able any SP to offer PABAC authentication without the need to
deploy any cryptographic credential verification stacks.
9 Conclusions
In this work we propose an architecture for preserving privacy
with device-centric and attribute-based authentication while
also solving the serious caveats that the password paradigm has.
It serves as an alternative for SPs that wish to replace their ex-
isting authentication mechanisms without the need to deploy
any sophisticated software stacks. We readily admit that not all
components of our architecture are individually novel. How-
ever, combining them together under one architecture, they pro-
duce the first proof-of-concept that password-less authentica-
tion can be done securely and in a user-friendly fashion under
the device-centric paradigm. Our evaluation results show that
our solution can be adopted by end-users and SPs without fric-
tion.
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